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Sassen’s identification of global cities as ‘strategic places’ is explored through 
world city network analysis. This involves searching out advanced producer 
service (APS) firms that constitute ‘strategic networks’, from whose activities 
strategic places can be defined. 25 out of 175 APS firms are found to be strategic 
and from their office networks, 45 cities out of 526 are designated as strategic 
places. A measure of ‘strategicness’ of cities is devised and individual findings 
from this are discussed by drawing on existing literature about how APS firms 
use specific cities. A key finding shows that New York and London have different 
levels of strategicness and this is related to the former’s innovation prowess and 
the latter’s role in global consumption of services. Other cases of strategicness 
discussed in terms of the balance between production and consumption of 
advanced producer services are: Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai; Palo Alto; 








In her classic The Global City Saskia Sassen (1991, 3-4) identified, as her ‘point of 
departure’, processes of globalization that had ‘created a new strategic role for 
major cities’ resulting in a ‘new type of city’ that ‘is the global city’. In her 
subsequent textbook on the subject, she distinguished global cities as one of 
three types of ‘strategic places’ (Sassen 1994, 18) – later extended to four 
(Sassen 2006, 31) – but her discussion makes clear that it is global cities that are 
by far the most important strategic places in economic globalization. The prime 
purpose of this paper is to investigate cities as strategic places in contemporary 
globalization using the methodology developed as world city network analysis 
(Taylor 2001, 2004; Taylor et al. 2011). This approach deals with many more 
cities than Sassen considers: here we ask the question, which of these numerous 
cities can be reasonably identified as strategic places? We deploy world city 
network analysis findings to answer this question quantitatively so that amongst 
the cities thus identified we can measure degrees of ‘strategicness’. From this we 
explore different ways in which cities are being strategic drawing on the 
literature dealing with selected individual cities. 
 
We treat the concept of strategic places as a specific expression of Eric 
Sheppard’s (2002) geographical positionality within globalization. One of the 
examples he draws upon in his broad discussion of positionality is the ‘status’ of 
cities being defined ‘by their position within transnational networks’ so that ‘one 
can see that the role and trajectory of such cities is bound up with their 
positionality’ (p. 324). In arguing that ‘[o]ur understanding of the spatiality of 
globalization will be impoverished … if positionality is neglected’ (p. 319), 
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Sheppard lists several advantages of this approach (p. 319, 325-6) two of which 
are particularly relevant to our study of strategic places. First, there is the matter 
of mutuality across networks: the role of the non-local in constituting all local 
places whatever the scale of definition – the conditions for change depend upon 
‘direct interactions with distant places’ and not just ‘local initiative’ (p. 319). 
Second, this same mutuality, which is the essence of network building, can lead 
researchers away from considering the ‘unequal power relations’ (p. 319) that 
also inhabit networks – all nodes are equal but some are more equal (strategic) 
than others. This fits neatly with our world city network analysis where it is 
advanced producer service firms that are the global network-makers and it is 
their urban agglomeration that creates Sassen’s global cities. Thus what is 
strategic has to be treated from two directions. From the perspective of cities 
there are key firms that operate as strategic networks, which cities need to be 
part of; but equally, from the perspective of firms there are key cities that are 
strategic places, where firms have to be. Thus our argument will bring together 
Castells’ (1996) spaces of flows and spaces of places into a single analysis and 
interpretation.  
 
We build this analysis and interpretation on the foundations provided by 
literatures documenting the internationalization of advanced producer service 
firms such as accountancy, advertising, architecture, finance and law (Bagchi-Sen 
and Sen 1997; Bryson et al. 2004; Daniels 1993; Faulconbridge et al. 2008; Jones 
2002). This literature details the way firms’ policies target particular city spaces 
as part of efforts to construct coordination capabilities that support both 
markets exploitation/development and innovation priorities. As such, strategic 
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cities are the sites through which APS can both deploy but also develop their 
core competencies; this mutual relationship being at the heart of agglomeration 
and localization processes that define the cluster-like economies of world cities 
(Bathelt et al., 2004; Cook et al., 2007; Faulconbridge et al., 2011).  By connecting 
questions of city strategicness to the location policies of internationalizing 
advanced producer service firms, we do not, however, aspire to match the subtle 
and nuanced treatment of positionality that Sheppard achieves, but we do 
attempt to provide a distinct empirical contribution to the discussion based on 
the foundations of the literature on the internationalization policies of advanced 
producer service firms: a strongly-evidenced, theoretically-sound set of results 
that do add something new to understanding cities in globalization. Our 
argument proceeds in seven parts: (i) we present the basic model that we use 
which specifies contemporary inter-city relations as an interlocking network; (ii) 
we outline the connections between the location policies of internationalizing 
advanced producer service firms and the production of strategic city places; (iii) 
we describe the data required to operationalize the model by creating a service 
values matrix showing how firms use cities, and initial forms of analyses from 
these data are described for both firms and cities; (iv) specific findings for 2010 
data are presented describing city-dyad contrasts and globalization strategies of 
firms; (v) strategic networks are derived from the globalization strategies and 
these are employed to identify strategic places; (vi) the strategicness of cities is 
derived by relating strategic network positions to cities’ encompassing global 
network positions; and (vii) we interpret our findings in relation to what the 
literature says about a number of specific cities we have found to be strategic 
places. What we thus add to the world city network literature is a comprehensive 
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assessment of cities in this category. Our most notable finding concerns London 
and New York. These two cities dominate world city rankings and are often 
functionally linked together as ‘NYLON’. Not surprisingly, both figure as strategic 
places in this study, but we are able to separate them in terms of ‘strategicness’: 
we will disentangle NYLON within the overall framework of the world city 
network.  
 
Advanced Producer Service Internationalization through Strategic Cities 
Since the seminal work on the role of advanced producer services (APS) in the 
global economy (Beyers 1992; Daniels 1993, 1995; Enderwick 1989), debates 
about the strategic role of cities have been at the forefront of concerns. Originally 
centered around questions about why APS cluster in cities, and spurning 
extensive analysis of the way city economies function using agglomeration and 
localization logics and their explanations of markets and innovation processes 
respectively (Pryke 1994; Grabher 2001; Cook et al. 2007; Faulconbridge et al., 
2011), this literature has developed in the past decade, as studies of the varying 
roles cities play in firms’ strategies have come to the fore (Beaverstock 2007; 
Faulconbridge et al. 2007, 2008, 2011; Jones 2002; McNeill 2008; Warf 2001). In 
this regard, Bagchi-Sen and Sen (1997) were ahead of their time when they 
deployed Dunning and Norman’s (1983) eclectic paradigm to analyse the 
location advantages for APS of different cities. In this work, the ‘size and 
character of the market; regulation of markets; (…) and the location of human 
(skilled labor) and physical assets’ were identified as core factors influencing 
where internationalizing APS chose to establish foreign outposts (Bagchi-Sen 
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and Sen 1997: 1158). However, even at this early stage of research, it was noted 
that ‘sector differentiation in terms of internationalization strategies’ (page 
1171) was crucial, accounting and advertising being compared and contrasted 
by Bagchi-Sen and Sen (1997).  
 
Further inspired by calls to open the black box used to represent firms and their 
strategies in studies of corporations driving economic globalization (Taylor and 
Asheim 2001; Yeung 2005), the most recent research on APS 
internationalization, therefore, seeks to identify (i) groups of firms that share 
common strategic objectives, and (ii) the differing role of cities in the fulfilling of 
these objectives. In relation to issue (i), it is possible to distinguish between what 
might be called the ubiquitous presence versus the strategic presence approach. 
The former, most commonly adopted by the Big Four accountancy firms 
(Beaverstock 1996), major financial institutions (Wójcik 2011) and hybrid 
producer-consumer services such as temporary staffing agencies (Coe et al. 
2007), involves maintaining a presence in as many cities as possible so as to 
allow revenue maximisation through the servicing of local clients’ needs. The 
latter, associated more with advertising (Faulconbridge et al. 2011), architecture 
(McNeill 2008) and law firms (Faulconbridge 2008), is driven by a desire to 
locate offices in the most strategically important places, strategic importance 
being defined in terms of both the global influence and connectedness of markets 
and the extent to which work in these places is cutting edge in terms of 
innovation and thus global profile. Similar variations in strategy are also noted 
by Goerzen et al. (2013) in their analysis of the location strategies of Japanese 
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multinationals (including but not limited to APS), with only certain firms 
prioritising location in strategic world cities.  
 
Connected to debates about internationalization strategy and the more or less 
strategic role of different places are also questions about the organizational form 
of APS. For instance, Faulconbridge et al. (2008) synthesise a range of research 
on APS and apply it to the case of executive search to reveal that depending on 
the strategic importance of a city, alongside regulatory constraints and issues of 
institutional distance, internationalization may involve: owned offices 
(traditional foreign direct investment); the establishment of networks 
(collaboration with local independent APS rather than direct investment); or a 
hybrid of the two former approaches (investment in already existing local APS 
who retain some autonomy but become tightly integrated into global corporate 
networks). Whilst there is some variability, particularly when regulatory 
barriers restrict the activities of foreign companies in a market as has been the 
case in India and China for many APS, owned strategies tend to be associated 
with the most strategically important sites, whilst networks are used to provide 
presence when needed in markets that are uncertain in terms of regulatory 
barriers, stability or strategic importance. Hybrids allowed mid-ranking city 
nodes that are integrated into global economic flows but in less strategic ways to 
be effectively served. The example of the executive search firm Korn/Ferry given 
by Faulconbridge et al. (2008) is illustrative of such connections between 
organizational form and the strategicness of a city. Owned offices dominate the 
firm’s internationalization strategy, which involves presence in a total of over 70 
cities. However, the owned approach is restricted to the most strategic locations, 
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such as London, New York, Frankfurt etc. Hybrid forms are used in locations that 
have less strategic importance, for instance in Mexico City and Monterey, whilst 
networks allow a flag to be planted in locations of potential future importance 
(e.g., Johannesburg) or where a token presence is required but markets are 
limited (e.g., Auckland).    
 
The APS literature reveals, then, two important insights relevant to the analysis 
and interpretation of the way cities do or do not become strategic places in the 
world city network created by APS firms. First, it shows that not all APS have the 
same significance when presence or absence is being used as a proxy of 
strategicness. The ubiquitous presence strategy means that sectors such as 
accounting and finance potentially maintain a presence in both more and less 
strategic cities. Hence we expect most firms in these sectors not to be evident in 
measures of strategicness. Meanwhile, firms in other sectors that adopt a 
strategic presence approach will likely be more conspicuous in analyses seeking 
proxies for city strategicness. Second, the APS literature also reveals that whilst a 
firm may have tens or hundreds of offices, not all of these offices share an equal 
level of strategic importance. Variations in strategicness may be reflected in the 
organizational form used to manage presence but also in other characteristics 
such as size and staffing. With these insights in mind, the remainder of the paper 
considers how such understandings of variations in the strategic role of cities in 
APS internationalization might be both captured in world city network analysis 
methodologies and used to understand the urban spatial architecture of current 
day global capitalism. 
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Basic Model: Interlocking Network Specification 
To deploy the insights gained from the APS literature, it is important to consider 
their implications for the assumptions in the interlocking network model used in 
world city network analysis. To do this, we begin by briefly reprising the model’s 
key premises. Our first premise is that cities are formed through commercial 
relations with other cities (Jacobs 1969), and that these inter-city relations 
compose networks (Taylor et al. 2010). As the products of commerce, generic 
city networks are specified as interlocking networks. This type of network has an 
unusual formation in that it operates through three levels instead of two. As well 
as the net and node levels common to all networks, it has a third ‘sub-nodal’ 
level. This is its vital property for understanding commercial city networks 
because it is at the sub-nodal level that we find the agents of the networking 
process: connections between a firm’s offices in different cities are the basis of 
network-making. In identifying these agents we avoid reifying cities as economic 
agents: it is firms that create city networks by their everyday work through 
multiple locations. Therefore city networks encompass the net level at the scale 
of the economy the cities operate in, the node level as cities, and a sub-nodal 
level as multi-location firms. In the specific case of the contemporary world city 
network, these are the global economy, important cities across the world 
including Sassen’s global cities, and leading advanced producer service firms 
(Taylor 2001).  
 
The choice of specifying advanced producer service firms as the economic agents 
making the world city network derives directly from Sassen’s (1991) 
identification of this economic sector as key creator of her global cities. This 
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occurs in two ways. First, global cities through their ‘control and command 
functions’ house corporate headquarters and agencies of government that 
provide the main market for advanced producer services. Second, it is these 
cities that are the production centers for advanced producer services, the places 
where product and process innovations keep growing this cutting edge economic 
sector. This consumption/production dual character of global cities will have a 
central role in interpreting the strategic places we identify below. However, we 
depart from Sassen’s use of advanced producer services to identify a small 
subset of cities as ‘global’ and instead recognise that advanced producer services 
are much more widespread than her discussion implies. We define a world city 
network based upon the activities of advanced producer service firms that 
encompasses several hundred cities across the world. This reflects the fact that 
economic globalization is an all-encompassing process; there are no ‘un-global 
cities’, just variations in the form and intensity of global processes across 
different cities based largely upon a city’s historical trajectory and contemporary 
positionality. Thus we specify the world city network in terms of the worldwide 
office networks of leading advanced producer service firms.  
 
The world city network is formally specified in Taylor (2001); here we provide 
the basic outline. The network is represented by a city-by-firm matrix Vij, where 
vi,j is the ‘service value’ of city i to firm j. This service value is a standardized 
measure of the importance of a city to a firm’s office network, which depends on 
the size and functions of a firm’s office(s) in a city.  
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The inter-city connectivity between two cities a and i (ICCa-i) is defined as1: 
 ICCa-i = ∑ va,j . vi,j (where a ≠ i)     (1) 
This provides a measure of the potential work flows, transfers of information 
and knowledge, between pairs of cities. The assumption behind conceiving the 
product of service values as a surrogate for actual flows between cities a and i for 
firm j is that the more important the office, the more links there will be with 
other offices in a firm’s network. In other words, we are using a simple 
interaction relation as our measure of connectivity: two cities housing large 
offices will generate more inter-city work flows between them than two cities 
each with small offices.  
 
Typically in world city network analysis these inter-city connectivities are 
aggregated for each city and the totals are interpreted as the global network 
connectivity of a city (GNC), indicating a city’s overall importance within the 
network: 
GNCa = ∑ ICCa-i (where a ≠ i)     (2) 
This has been the main measure derived from the model and can be interpreted 
as how well a city is integrated into the world city network, and hence its ‘global 
status’. 
 
                                                         
1 It is in principle possible to generate two different networks based on the data 
measuring the presence of firms in cities: a firm-to-firm network and a city-to-city 
network (Neal 2008; Liu and Derudder, 2012). As our interest is primarily in identifying 
well-connected cities through firms’ location strategies, our focus here – as in most 
world city network analyses - is on the city networks. 
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Basic Data: Filling the Service Values Matrix 
To operationalize this model requires assessment of firms’ office networks to 
empirically construct a city-by-firm matrix Vij of service values. The data 
required for this exercise are readily available on firms’ websites where they 
promote their ‘global’ status as a means of both impressing clients in a 
competitive services market and recruiting graduates in a competitive jobs 
market. However, this source, plus supplementary information as available, 
produces different levels and types of information for every firm. Thus for each 
firm the data have to be converted by using a simple coding system to enable 
cross-firm comparison for analysis. We use a coding from 0 to 5, whereby the 
service values vi,j: 0 indicates a city where firm j has no presence and 5 is firm j’s 
headquarter city. Codes 1 to 4 are then allocated as follows: a typical office of 
firm j scores a city 2, there must be something deficient to lower the score to 1, 
and something extra for it to rise above 2. For the latter, an especially large office 
scores 3, an office with extra-city jurisdictions (e.g. regional HQ) scores 4. Each 
firm is assessed individually to decide on boundary decisions away from 2. With 
n firms and m cities, such data collection creates an n firms x m cities array of 
service values, the basic matrix for interlocking network analysis. Each column of 
the matrix shows a firm’s location strategy as a string of integers from 0 to 5 
across m cities; each row shows a city’s service mix as a string from 0 to 5 across 
n firms.  
 
In 2010 we assessed the office networks of 175 firms across 526 cities. The 
former consisted of 75 financial services firms and 25 each of accountancy, 
advertising, law and management consultancy firms. Firms were chosen using 
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trade information ranking firms by size based upon the latest information 
available (e.g. on turnover). Cities were chosen on the basis of previous 
experience in this work (315 cities used in earlier data collections) plus all other 
cities with more than 2 million population, all other capital cities of countries 
with over one million population, and all other cities housing the headquarters of 
one of our 175 firms. These are arbitrary rules of inclusion but the aim was to 
include more cities than necessary (526 in all) so as not to exclude any 
potentially relevant cities in what is a very dynamic process of world city 
network formation. The end result is a 175 firms x 526 cities matrix for 2010 
providing 92,050 service values for analysis. 
 
Specific Findings for 2010: City-dyad Analysis and Globalization Strategies 
There are two findings from analyses of these 2010 data that have stimulated the 
current paper. One concerns a city-dyads analysis that focuses on the inter-city 
connectivities as defined in equation (1) (Taylor et al. 2013a). The other is a 
principal components analysis of the service values matrix treating firms’ 
location strategies as the input, as 175 variables (Taylor et al. 2013b).  For full 
details of these analyses, readers are referred to the original papers; here we 
highlight specific findings that will directly feed into how we understand 
strategic networks and strategic places in subsequent analysis. 
 
In any city-dyad analysis of a large matrix such as ours, there are myriad pairs of 
cities whose inter-city connectivities can be computed as given in equation (1). 
The initial way of dealing with this surfeit of results is to concentrate on just the 
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largest connectivities: in this case only the leading 40 city-dyad connectivities 
are considered. In Table 1 the number of times each city from the top 20 cities as 
defined by global network connectivity (equation (2)) features in the leading 
inter-city connectivities is listed. For instance, New York appears in more top 40 
city-dyads than any other city, 10 times in all. Because global network 
connectivity is composed of inter-city connectivities (equation (2)), there will be 
a broad relation between overall global network connectivity and the number of 
leading city-dyads a city belongs to. For instance, it can be seen that there are 7 
out of these 20 cities that do not feature at all in the leading city-dyads by inter-
city connectivities and these are generally found in the lower ranks of global 
network connectivity in Table 1. But this relation is far from being definitive, 
Dubai has no partners in top 40 city-dyads despite being ranked 9th for global 
network connectivity. In stark contrast, Frankfurt, ranked a lowly 19th for global 
network connectivity, is a member of 8 such city-dyads, which puts it on a par 
with Hong Kong, Singapore and Shanghai and only one behind London. What can 
this mean? 
 
In such circumstances it is often the exceptions to the rule that are particularly 
informative and this is what makes the Dubai/Frankfurt comparison so 
intriguing. A city’s global network connectivity is an aggregate measure that tells 
us nothing about the specific inter-city connections that constitute it: how many 
connections it is composed of (i.e. the number of other cities it shares firms 
with), which cities it is more strongly connected to and where it is relatively 
weakly connected. Thus what appears to be happening with Dubai’s global 
network connectivity is that it is composed of a relatively dispersed pattern of 
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inter-city connectivities featuring more less-important cities than expected for 
its global network connectivity ranking. Frankfurt, on the other hand, tends to 
have a more concentrated pattern of inter-city connections constituting its global 
network connectivity, particularly featuring other major cities. Our preliminary 
interpretation is to link this to these cities’ – in Sheppard’s (2002) terms - 
positionalities in the world city network: Frankfurt has a more strategic position 
within the world city network than Dubai despite the fact that the latter is more 
generally integrated into the network. It was this train of thought that stimulated 
us to consider how we could extrapolate from this particular finding and 
measure the strategicness of cities more generally. To go down this research 
path requires us to examine the network-makers, the firms whose office 
networks lie behind the Dubai/Frankfurt contrast, and indeed other 
discrepancies in the relation between global network connectivity and 
membership of top 40 city-dyads displayed in Table 1. 
 
The second study we draw upon concerns analysis of advanced producer service 
firms’ office networks as location strategies. Obviously every firm considers its 
products and their markets when deciding to invest the capital to set up a new 
office in another city. Thus the outcome of these decisions at any one point in 
time constitutes a firm’s location strategy. This particular geography is 
represented by a firm’s column of integers in the service values matrix; for 2010 
we have 175 such strategies. Although every strategy is different across our 
firms there are some clear similarities amongst them that can be teased out 
using a principal components analysis. This technique is a ‘data reduction’ 
method that converts x variables into y components where y is appreciably 
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smaller than x. This is achieved by using the correlations between variables to 
combine them into groups of like variables, the ‘principal components’ of the 
data. The importance of each component is derived from its correlations (called 
‘loadings’) with the original variables. In the analysis reported here the 175 
individual firm location strategies (variables) were reduced to just 10 
components that are interpreted as common location strategies. Of these 10 
components, two were interpreted as representing the core formation of 
economic globalization (Taylor et al. 2013b), and were statistically much more 
important than the others, between them accounting for 40% of the common 
variance found in the service values matrix. We concentrate on these two 
common location strategies here. 
 
The characteristics of principal components can be discerned from their 
component scores on the objects of the analysis, in this case the cities. The scores 
for the two main components identified above, illustrating the two leading 
common location strategies from the 2010 service values matrix, are given in 
Table 2. These strategies are labelled intensive and extensive globalizations for 
reasons that will become apparent as we describe them. In each case we identify 
a ‘home-region’ on which the strategy is centered – most of the headquarters of 
the firms that constitute each component are to be found here (see Taylor et al. 
2013b, Table 3) – and a ‘global outreach’ that identifies how the rest of the world 
is serviced through the location strategy. In both cases we find the home-region 
encompasses US cities plus London – we have coined the term ‘USAL’ to describe 
this global-regional formation (Taylor et al. 2013b). However, although 
overlapping, the constitution of these two regions is quite distinctive: in the first 
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list in Table 2 there are 12 US cities plus London, in the second just three US 
cities plus London. With global outreach we find the obverse: just six cities in the 
first list but with 33 featuring in the second list. The reason for their specific 
labels is as follows. The intensive globalization strategy focuses on the prime 
locus through which economic globalization was initially constructed (USAL) 
with the rest of the world serviced through just three key cities in each of the 
two other major ‘globalization arenas’ – Brussels, Frankfurt and Paris in Western 
Europe and Hong Kong, Tokyo and Beijing in Pacific Asia. In contrast the 
extensive globalization strategy emanates from just four main USAL cities 
combined with a very comprehensive servicing across the rest of the world: the 
top 5 cities in the global outreach are from regions beyond USAL, Western 
Europe and Pacific Asia (the latter two regions are represented, but primarily by 
their less important cities such as Athens and Kuala Lumpur).  
 
In what follows we use results from the two globalization strategies to try and 
understand the findings from the previous city-dyad analysis, specifically to 
generalize beyond the Dubai/Frankfurt contrast. 
 
Identifying Strategic Networks and Strategic Places  
In our model it is the firms that are the agents of globalization, the transnational 
network makers, and therefore to comprehend strategy we start by identifying 
strategic firms, and then use them to find the strategic places that are our initial 
concern in this paper. 
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Although the two components are orthogonal (i.e. not related, their correlation 
equals zero), there will be specific firms that use elements of both common 
strategies as reflected in their loadings on the two components. These are the 
firms we will identify as ‘global strategic firms’. Specifically, we use firms’ 
component loadings on (i.e. levels of correlations with) the intensive and 
extensive globalization strategies to define a ‘global strategic measure’ for all 
175 firms in our data. We compute the product of the loadings on the two 
components for each firm to create this measure. Global strategic firms are then 
identified as those with a measure of 0.10 and above. The basic reasoning behind 
this procedure is to find firms with relatively high positive loadings on both 
components. Thus firms with a negative loading on one of the components are 
immediately eliminated. Firms scoring high on one component but not the other 
are similarly discarded: even with a rare high loading on 0.8 on a component, a 
firm would require a loading of at least 0.125 on the other component to reach a 
measure of 0.10. In a more balanced case, a firm loading 0.33 on both 
components would similarly just qualify. The results of this exercise are shown 
in Table 3 where 25 global strategic firms are listed. 
 
We can see from Table 3 that law is the sector with most strategic firms, nine in 
total which is 36% of law firms in the data.  Management consultancy with 8 
firms (32%) and advertising with 5 firms (20%) make up the bulk of remaining 
strategic firms. In complete contrast, financial services has only three of the 
firms listed, which is just 4% of financial firms in the data. There are no 
accountancy firms at all that are identified as being strategic.. The dearth of firms 
in these latter two sectors is consistent with the insight drawn from the APS 
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internationalization literature reviewed earlier: the ubiquitous presence 
strategies of the big accountancy and financial services firms result in their office 
networks mostly  being excluded in operationalizing measurement of 
strategicness. In addition, geographical exclusion in this selection of firms in 
Table 3 is even more extreme: apart from a single London firm, all the firms are 
US firms (i.e. in our previous parlance, they are all from USAL).  
 
We are now in a position to identify which cities are strategic places within the 
world city network: we define these as cities that house offices of 10 or more of 
the strategic firms identified in the analytical step outlined above. This produces 
a list of 46 cities shown in Table 4.2 The cities are ranked by their strategic 
network connectivity derived from computing the network connectivity defined 
by equation (2) but only including the 25 strategic firms in the calculations. Most 
of the cities Sassen (1991) mentions as ‘global cities’ appear in the top half of this 
table with the cities she focuses on being ranked first (New York), second 
(London) and tenth (Tokyo). From our previous discussion we can immediately 
note that Frankfurt (13th) ranks higher than Dubai (18th) supporting our 
preliminary suggestion that the former was more strategically placed in the 
world city network than the latter. We can now see that this finding is largely on 
account of Frankfurt attracting more strategic firms than Dubai: 20 to 15. All 25 
strategic firms are found in London and New York, the latter is ranked higher 
                                                         
2 It should be noted that although this methodology includes arbitrary threshold 
decisions for defining strategic firms and strategic places, these were not the only ones 
tested in the research. The key point is that the different choices had very little effect on 
subsequent analysis. In other words, the results we present below are quite robust with 
minor differences having no relevance to the conclusions drawn.  
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because its offices tend to be more important than London’s (e.g. more 
headquarters): this is shown by the higher connectivity New York obtains from 
its strategic firms’ offices. Other cities with high connectivity per strategic firm 
office are Miami, just above New York, and Johannesburg and Düsseldorf just 
below New York. All three of these cities are specialist regional centers with 
important extra-mural functions (e.g. continental-scale regional headquarters).  
 
Relating Strategic Network Connectivity to Global Network Connectivity 
We have regressed strategic network connectivity against global network 
connectivity and recorded the residuals. These are standardized (zero mean and 
a standard deviation of one) so that positive numbers indicate relative strategic 
over-connectedness and negative numbers relative strategic under-
connectedness. In Table 5 cities are ranked by size of their residuals to show the 
importance of their strategic connectivity relative to overall connectivity.  
 
The follow findings from this analysis are highlighted: 
 There is a clear difference between New York and London: the former is 
the most over-connected city relative to its global connectivity whereas 
London is actually under-connected and ranks a lowly 26th. It is unusual 
to show these two cities so starkly separated in studies of world or global 
cities. 
 Other leading US cities are also ranked high on this relative measure 
taking ranks 2 through 5. Note that this does not include Washington 
(only ranked 17th) despite its importance to US law firms. This confirms 
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our measure of strategicness is more than simply reflecting the 
geography of law firm networks. 
 But the really interesting US city in this analysis is Palo Alto. Ranked a 
lowly 263rd in global network connectivity it has by far the highest 
proportion of this connectivity as strategic (an outlier at 16%, the other 
cities range from 7% to 11%). This creates a ranking of 4th in Table 5; it 
obviously reflects its special positionality in Silicon Valley. 
 Although Chinese cities are increasingly important in terms of global 
network connectivity this is not being reflected in strategicness – only 
Shanghai is recorded as strategically over-connected but barely so. 
However their respective order – Shanghai, Beijing, Hong Kong – is 
interesting, especially in separating Shanghai from Hong Kong. 
 Amongst cities from other erstwhile ‘third world’ countries, these are 
generally under-connected: Buenos Aires, Delhi. Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, 
Mexico City, Mumbai and Sao Paulo all have large negative residuals, with 
the latter being the highest ranked at only 31st.  
 The exception to the above is Johannesburg, which is highly over-
connected in strategicness and is ranked 11th overall. This presumably 
reflects the city’s positionality with regards to extracting African raw 
materials. 
 And finally we can note that earlier observations about the contrast 
between Dubai and Frankfurt are confirmed here: the latter is excessively 
under-connected for strategicness, ranked next to last, whereas Frankfurt 
is strongly over-connected (ranked 12th). 
 
 24 
This strategic network geography that we have uncovered within the world city 
network is shown in Figure 1; it forms the basis of our specific interpretations of 
strategic places and their differences below. 
 
Interpretation of Positionalities: Disentangling ‘NYLON’ and More 
The quantitative findings shown in Table 5 and represented in Figure 1 require 
interpretation based upon both theoretical extensions of the model employed 
and empirical knowledge of the cities as advanced producer service centers. In 
practice these two needs cannot be separated (and this is particularly the case 
when we try and comprehend our results on New York and London). However in 
terms of the empirics, clearly we cannot deal with all 46 cities and therefore we 
proceed as follows. We begin with consideration of London and New York, surely 
the world’s most studied cities, and focus on writings that have discussed their 
differences. In addition, our interpretation takes in Castells’ (1996) specification 
of his spaces of flows from which our model derives. We then deploy what we 
have learned from this prime city-dyad comparison to other specific cases. These 
are chosen from a mixture of intrinsic interest and availability of relevant 
literature to meet our needs: we present vignettes dealing with Beijing, Hong 
Kong and Shanghai; Palo Alto: Mexico City; Johannesburg; and conclude by 
returning to the contrast between Dubai and Frankfurt.   
London and New York 
London and New York define the only city-dyad that actually has a name: 
NYLON. It is part of a tradition that sees these cities at the forefront of fashion 
and which has been enhanced by economic globalization whereby leading world 
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movers and shakers are said to work through three offices, one in each city and 
another in transit over the Atlantic. Smith (2012, 421) describes how these two 
cities have come to be viewed as a single city: ‘a transatlantic metropolis that is 
the heart-beat of the global economy’. The key point that Smith makes is that the 
cities operate in conjunction for the benefit of a small rich minority. But the 
conflation of the two cities hides the differences that we are seeking. Their 
complementarities are based upon dissimilarity and this has been the subject of 
a careful comparison as global financial centers by Sassen (1999) and Wójcik 
(2013). 
 
According to Sassen (1999, 81) New York and London constitute ‘a cooperative 
division of labor’ that operates as follows:  
(i) ‘London is the preeminent city for global finance today, in good part due 
to numerous international firms that have located key operations and 
resources in the City [so that] London’s unique denationalized 
platform for global operations gives it its competitive advantage’ (pp. 
83-4); 
(ii) But ‘what London lacks is Wall Street’s brilliant financial engineering’ and 
therefore ‘New York dominates in another way by offering market 
innovations and new financial products. Wall street – still the Silicon 
Valley of finance – has made U.S. investment firms leaders in the 
global market’ (pp. 83-4). 
More than a decade later it seems that this differentiation is still very much in 
place; Wójcik (2013, pp. 6-7), in a new survey but also drawing on Strange 
(1997) and Michie (2006), describes it this way:  
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‘While New York commands access to the largest and most liquid 
domestic financial market in the world, London’s physical, political and 
historical geography implies access to a different time zone, European 
markets, and global connections … Taking advantage of its sheer liquid 
domestic market, and the deepest pool of financial engineering talent, 
New York leads financial innovation... Hedge funds come from the USA, 
and so do venture capital and private equity. Most new products and 
methods of trading in the global securities markets emanated from New 
York…. London, in turn, has specialized as a centre, where financial firms 
(with US banks in the lead) adapt financial innovation from the USA to 
foreign and international markets.’ 
The message is clear: London is particularly good for global financial business, 
New York is particularly good for global financial innovations.  
 
These key differences between New York and London in the world city network 
can be equated with Castells (1996, 413) distinction between hubs and nodes in 
his space of flows: 
‘Some places are exchangers, communication hubs playing a role of 
coordination for the smooth interaction of all the elements integrated into 
the network. Other places are the nodes of the network, that is the 
location of strategically important functions that build a series of locality-
based activities and organizations around a key function in the network’ 
In these terms, London appears more ‘hub-like’ through integrating business 
(something the reforms of Big Bang in the late 1980s were explicitly designed to 
facilitate) while New York is more ‘node-like’ in building new functions, the 
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latter interpreted as being more strategic. Further, there is a sense in which 
London is ‘used’ with New York firms as key ‘users’, indicating a hierarchical 
element in the cities’ complementarities that Sassen (1999, 81) recognised (see 
also Wall and Knaap 2011). And returning to her essential ‘global city’ process 
(Sassen 1991) where the city is both a market for and a producer of APS, we can 
view the relationship between these two functions as variable across cities: high 
levels of new production relative to market (exchange) is a distinctive strategic 
place process, more focus on market service than production is a general 
network process. Indeed, we can see just such a distinction in the strategies of 
internationalizing US law firms. In the initial years at least, these firms primarily 
practiced US (and New York specifically) law in London as part of a strategy 
designed to exploit the demand for advice about the structuring of financial 
transactions using New York law (Cullen-Mandikos and MacPherson 2002; Warf 
2001). Such an interpretation provides both an explanation for our results 
showing New York exhibiting more ‘strategicness’ than London, and also 
suggests a general means of comparing cities in the world city network in terms 
of their relative strategicness.  
Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai 
To illustrate the latter we can turn briefly to the China cities in our analysis using 
Lai’s (2012) study of the mutualities between Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai 
as financial centers. She describes a ‘dual headquarter strategy’ for Beijing-
Shanghai relations and ‘parallel markets’ for Hong Kong-Shanghai relations. 
Although she equates Hong Kong’s role with that of New York (p. 1275), if we 
move analysis from city-dyad to city-triad a rather different picture obtains. 
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The roles of the three China cities are quite distinctive. Beijing is the political 
center, ‘responsible for policy-making and macro planning’ (Lai 2012, 1283), in 
other words the locus of command and control. Shanghai, on the other hand, ‘is 
tasked with testing new products, developing new markets and financial 
innovation’ (p. 1283). The result is that Shanghai has ‘the highest concentration 
of foreign banks’ and hosts ‘new financial markets in futures, derivatives and 
foreign exchange’ (p. 1283). In contrast Hong Kong has grown as a strategic 
conduit ‘connecting global capital and China’ (p. 1275) and continues in the role 
of China’s ‘offshore financial centre.’ (p. 1275).  
 
It takes very little imagination to equate this structural logic to similar relations 
between Washington as political center, New York as innovative center, and 
London as offshore center. In the latter case both London and Hong Kong have 
exploited a political autonomy by being outside the direct 
sovereign/administrative control of the USA and China respectively. In other 
words these are necessary global platforms where you can do things that are not 
possible in the cities of the USA and mainland China.  
 
Our analysis adds weight to this city-triad comparison. In Table 5 the three China 
cities appear ranked in the same sequence as the USAL cities: New York and 
Shanghai are relatively most strategic, with London and Hong Kong least, and 
Washington and Beijing in between. London and Hong Kong, in particular, have 
very similar levels of relatively low strategicness.  
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Palo Alto 
As the main city in Silicon Valley, Palo Alto is a very special strategic place, as 
reflected in our analysis through its unusual combination of very low general 
integration into the world city network with very high strategicness. How does 
the production of high tech innovations that Silicon Valley is famous for transfer 
into APS innovation as our results imply? This special place has distinctive 
servicing needs that have led to specialization in deal making, advising new firm 
start-ups and university spin-offs, arranging access to venture capital, taking 
successful firms public, plus mergers and acquisitions activity (Lashinsky 2002; 
Reiffenstein 2009). The main sector providing these services is law and law 
firms, working as ‘patent attorneys’ in particular and facilitating innovation 
exploitation. Specifically, according to Reiffenstein (2009, 572), law firms ‘by 
mediating between the private interests of firms and the public concerns of the 
patent office, perform a critical role that is not merely ancillary but instrumental 
to the workings of the knowledge economy’. In other words, these law firms are 
part of the technology community (p. 579). In terms similar to those used to 
describe New York’s role in finance, Reiffenstein quotes Friedman et al. (1989) 
as saying that ‘the Silicon Valley lawyer not only works with engineers, he thinks 
of himself as a kind of engineer – a legal engineer’ (p. 578). Thus  
‘Silicon Valley occupies a special place in this [patent] system. Its 
attorneys are the “engineers” of business and legal precedent particularly 
as it relates to the translation of science to industry. Firms located there 
enjoy a locational advantage from a proximity to milieus of basic and 
applied research: buyers and sellers of technology’ (p. 580). 
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This special place is a strategic place because ‘every one of the major Silicon 
Valley law offices is a component of a much larger branch network’ (p. 579) 
enabling the firm ‘to link buyers and sellers of technology and to lubricate the 
innovative process by linking places’ (p. 580), now necessarily including 
‘international transactions’ (Lashinsky 2002). Thus Palo Alto is only a small city 
but it is a big player in the strategy of law firms and therefore the world city 
network as our strategicness analyses have shown. 
Mexico City 
Mexico City is strongly integrated into the world city network (in the top 20 
listed in Table 1) but according to our analyses it is relatively under-connected 
strategically (Table 5). We use Parnreiter’s (2010) study of how APS firms in 
Mexico City operate in global commodity chains to interpret our findings in this 
case. 
 
Parnreiter (2010, 36-7) begins by asking the crucial question, does the APS 
sector in Mexico City function as merely enabling agent of economic 
globalization or do these firms help shape the nature of the production networks 
they are servicing? To answer the question he finds he has to break with Sassen’s 
(1991) ‘equating the management of the world economy with its control’ (p. 43). 
These are two separate mechanisms that are ‘frequently conflated’ despite the 
fact that  
‘it is questionable whether all high-wage, high-tech and high-profit 
services necessary for running global production processes are actually 
related to decision-making. This question is particularly relevant to global 
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cities in non-core countries, which have a sizeable producer service sector 
but are normally not considered to host decision-making capacities’ (p. 
44). 
Thus although many of the practitioners he interviewed emphasize the 
importance of their local office within the world city network, Parnreiter is able 
to show that this is largely necessary work but not strategic work. He concludes 
‘Though at first glance it seems that the networks of producer service 
firms are rather flat, their organizational model implies that there is the 
chain of command. Despite the fact that the local cooperation is … seen as 
… essential to do business, the “big” strategies are made by the lead 
partners [and] the number of lead partners an office of a global service 
provider can have depends … by and large on the geography of 
headquarters of TNCs. Since there are far fewer companies with origins in 
Mexico that compete successfully in the world market than foreign firms 
in Mexico, the Mexico City offices of accountancy, legal or real estate firms 
will not often be in command’ (p. 47). 
This is entirely consistent with our finding on the differences between Mexico 
City’s global network connectivity and its strategic network connectivity. It also 
directly corresponds with the example presented above in our review of the APS 
literature in which the executive search firm Korn/Ferry uses a hybrid strategy 
to service Mexico City rather than the owned form used in the most strategic 
places. 
 
Since Parnreiter frames his argument in world-systems terms, we are invited to 
extrapolate this interpretation to other important cities from ‘non-core 
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countries’: from Table 5 and Figure 1 this would include São Paulo, Jakarta, 
Buenos Aires, Kuala Lumpur, Delhi, and Mumbai. But not all cities from non-core 
countries are strategically under-connected. 
Johannesburg 
Bangkok and Johannesburg are the exceptions to Parnreiter’s argument in our 
analyses (Table 5, Figure 1). In the case of the latter we use Surborg’s (2011) 
study that employs positionality as his ‘point of departure’ (p. 325) and treats 
‘cities in the third world for what they are: places occupying a very specific 
position in the world economy, each one of them a unique place’ (p. 326).  
 
Drawing on Rogerson (2005), Surborg (2011) provides hints at what is unique 
about Johannesburg that may have enabled it to be more strategic than expected 
in a world of ‘uneven connections’. Put simply, in the post-apartheid era, 
‘Johannesburg’s experience was different from most other major cities in 
southern Africa because South Africa’s liberalisation of its economy was largely a 
result of domestic policy, while that of other countries … was usually the result of 
externally enforced structural adjustment policies’ (p. 324). Beyond his African 
comparisons, we can note that this posited relative autonomy can be also 
contrasted with Mexico City ‘trapped’, as it were, in the North America Free 
Trade Association (NAFTA).3 Both Johannesburg and Mexico City can be 
designated ‘gateway cities’ linking ‘national “investment opportunities” to global 
                                                         
3 The fact that Toronto, the only Canadian city to be included in our 46 strategic places, 
is ranked bottom in Table 5 does clearly suggest that NAFTA has tended to work for the 
benefit of APS firms in leading US cities at the expense of their Canadian and Mexican 
counterparts. 
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circuits of capital’ (p. 319) but whereas Parnreiter (2010, 50) concludes that 
Mexico City operates as ‘a “bridgehead” for the interests of the dominant centres 
of the world economy’, Johannesburg’s recent trajectory may have encompassed 
more autonomy in the world economy for its economic elites resulting in the 
city’s ‘specific position’ being more strategic in the world city network.4  
 
A note of caution has to be inserted here. We do not have anywhere near the 
quality of evidence upon which Parnreiter (2010) based his Mexico City research 
for our understanding of Johannesburg in the world city network. The review of 
work on APS also suggests that in some cases Johannesburg’s strategicness 
relates to the future, exemplifying the way key cities are emerging that are at the 
heart of the BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and now South Africa). 
Thus at this time, ideas about the reasons for Johannesburg’s strategic 
positioning remain in the realm of speculation. Our findings for this city suggest 
further research is needed to pinpoint the mechanism attracting strategic APS 
firms to Johannesburg.  
                                                         
4 For recent examples of two of our ‘strategic firms’, see ‘New Johannesburg Office: A 
Gateway to Africa for Canadian Mining Companies’ at 
emailcc.com/rv/ff000884c0cfb0734ec2b80e1d49beb856820713 (accessed 01-Sep-
2012), and see ‘Bain & Company expands Financial Services practice in South Africa’ 
where it is announced that ‘We are growing our team of financial specialists at a time of 
global challenges and unique opportunities for South Africa’s leading players’ at 
www.bain.com/about/press/press-releases/bain-and-company-expands-financial-
services-practice-in-south-africa.aspx (accessed 01-Sep-2012). 
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Dubai and Frankfurt 
Finally, we return to Dubai and Frankfurt, whose alleged differences in 
strategicness (Table 1) first stimulated this research. The disparity between 
these cities is a clear case of contrasting positionalities. Frankfurt’s relatively 
high strategic importance results from its established position as Germany’s 
leading financial center and major hub for specialist business services that has 
long served as the primary – though not exclusive (see Düsseldorf’s and Munich’s 
position in Table 5; Hoyler 2011) – gateway to Europe’s largest economy for 
transnational firms, particularly those originating in the U.S. (Grote 2008; Hoyler 
et al. 2008). Dubai, however, has recently been described as merely a gateway to 
itself (Bassens 2013). This intriguing explanation of the remarkable rise of Dubai 
as a ‘global city’ requires explication.  
 
The residuals of our regression analysis suggest that Dubai is, indeed, one of the 
least strategic places in the world city network: it is ranked 45th out of 46 cities. 
Bassens (2013) argues that the city’s extensive connectivity in the office 
networks of APS firms does not imply that it is a global city in the full, rich sense 
of ‘strategic sites’ as put forward by Sassen (1991). Based on inter alia an 
analysis of how and why London-based financial services firms have become 
involved in Dubai, he concludes that Dubai is above all seen as a site of 
opportunity by these firms, i.e. a market in itself for speculative surplus 
generation for regional and global capital: 
 
‘(T)he growth of Dubai has been mostly financed by UK investments or at 
least has been channeled through the UK, via a growing array of funds, 
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asset management, banks, and other financial service firms in The City of 
London. Part of these investment may very well originate in the Gulf 
Region itself but have been recycled and re-imported in the region, a 
process mostly mediated by banks based in The City, which have a long 
business history in the Gulf.’ (Bassens 2013) 
 
Many financial services firms have an office in Dubai, which has thus become a 
well-connected APS cluster because it ‘controls’ access to its urban investment 
categories, which are mainly real estate markets and large infrastructure 
projects. Hence, Bassens (2013) suggests that Dubai should be viewed as what 
he calls a ‘gateway global city’, not to a region as Mexico City does for Mexico and 
Frankfurt does for Germany, but mainly to itself. In line with the ‘strategicness’ of 
cities for APS firms as described in our literature review, Dubai is well-connected 




This paper has added to our knowledge of the contemporary world city network 
by going beyond the basic measurement of global network connectivities to 
show a distinctive pattern of strategic network connectivities. Our findings 
appear credible and have been shown to link with literatures on selected 
individual cities and with work on APS and their strategic city location decisions 
and organizational forms. There are, of course, caveats to bear in mind when 
assessing these results overall. 
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 We have not produced definitive strategic places but rather specific 
strategic places relating to one economic sector, advanced producer 
services. We do argue the particular importance of this sector for 
economic globalization but there will be other strategic places for global 
commodity chains defined by other criteria (Goerzen et al. 2013). 
 We have provided a cross-sectional analysis for 2010 to define city 
positionalities but, of course, these are inherently historical; information 
on city trajectories is a necessary addition to make better sense of our 
results. 
 The latter point is very relevant to the fact we have used two USA-based 
(with London) location strategies of firms as the basis of the analysis, 
selected from ten identified global location strategies. This choice was 
justified by their being both the most important strategies identified and 
because they are from the world region that largely generated economic 
globalization. However it is their recent history and present that are being 
designated ‘most important’; but this designation may be less relevant for 
the future in a dynamic world economy: Pacific Asian, especially China, 
location strategies will have their own emerging strategic places that our 
methodology is not designed to find. 
What we have been able to do is provide some order in an increasingly complex 
economy through excavating strategic places within world city network 
structures. In this way we present an extensive picture in which to view the 
mechanisms of contemporary economic globalization.  
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We began with Sassen’s ‘global cities’ as new strategic places that have solved 
the problem of providing operational capacity in a new global economy. 
Although restricting ourselves to ‘spatial’ identification of the strategic, this 
concept has still emerged as a multifarious mix of processes. In particular, our 
strategic places appear to have various combinations of command capacity and 
generation of innovations with APS firms that develop strategic presence 
internationalization policies choosing to operate in these but not other cities to 
access such qualities. Strategic cities are, then, those that develop a reciprocal 
relationship between globally significant agglomeration and localization 
economies and APS; the latter needing to access but also helping (re)produce the 
former (Bathelt et al., 2004; Cook et al., 2007 Faulconbridge et al., 2011).  In 
contrast APS firms with ubiquitous strategies maintain a presence in both 
strategic cities and less strategic cities that act as local market nodes. In this way 
we have interwoven the two key points we identified in Sheppard’s geographical 
positionality: mutualities between the local and the non-local, and power 
relations within networks. Power in a world-city-as-strategic-place is 
represented overtly as command but also more covertly through innovation 
creating monopoly. But this power only has meaning through its deployment 
across networks involving other cities, both highly strategic and less so.  These 
two features of positionality have been most clearly articulated through the 
contrasting interpretations of London and New York in this research. 
 
It is, therefore, appropriate that we finish with a further comment on comparing 
London and New York, and we will do this by considering what spatial 
strategicness means for the futures of these two archetypal global cities. One 
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implication of strategy is that it is long term as opposed to tactical and 
operational. This suggests that in the aggregate, the more strategic a place, the 
more resilient it should be. Translated to global cities, this means New York is 
likely to be more resilient than London in an increasingly dynamic world 
economy. But we have also disaggregated strategicness in terms of what their 
different levels actually mean and this points to a quite different interpretation: 
the basic feature distinguishing New York’s strategicness from London’s is the 
former’s leadership in service innovation. This appears to broadly work as New 
York generating innovations, which are then widely applied in London for global 
consumption. Thus the economic success of the two global cities appears to 
parallel Jacobs’ (1969, 39) ‘two master economic processes’: new work through 
innovation in city economies, and diffusion of new work by import replacement 
in city economies. Clearly while global city New York is a case of the former, we 
can add that global city London is a case of the latter. The key point is that 
innovation is more complex but far less common than import replacement (as 
simpler imitation and adaption). It might well be that if the dynamism of the 
world economy does precipitate a move in the center of gravity eastwards, as 
commonly predicted, then New York’s strategic innovation character may be less 
resilient than London’s strategic imitation character: probably new work 
through other’s innovations (from wherever) will be easier to sustain than 
specific, local innovative activity itself. In this argument London can better adapt 
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